World reactions to the 1961 Paris Pogrom by Gordon, Daniel A
Daniel A. Gordon 
‘World Reactions to the 1961 Paris Pogrom’ 
University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, 1 (2000) 
World Reactions to the 1961 Paris Pogrom1 
 
Daniel A. Gordon 
 
 
On 17 October 1961 a peaceful protest of Algerians in Paris, against a night-time curfew 
which applied only to them, was organised by the Féderation de France of the Front de 
Libération National (FLN), near the end of its guerrilla war against the French authorities in 
Algeria (1954-1962). The march was brutally repressed by the police, with somewhere in the 
region of 200 fatalities. Long a taboo subject in France, these events have recently been the 
subject of public controversy, notably during the 1997-98 trial of Maurice Papon, the Paris 
prefect of police in 1961, for crimes carried out during the Second World War; and in 
Papon's unsuccessful 1999 libel action against the author of a prominent book on the 1961 
massacre, Jean-Luc Einaudi.2 This article aims to investigate the neglected subject of 
international responses to the 1961 massacre. 
The existing books on 17 October set it only in a Franco-Algerian context, apart from 
to note that Moroccans and Tunisians were also victims of police repression.3 But there are 
several reasons why a wider international dimension should be considered. Firstly, because 
instances were reported of the police lashing out at anyone with dark skin, their victims 
included many non-Algerians.4 It might be expected that those thus affected would bring 
concern about the repression to their countries of origin. Secondly, the war in general 
attracted much international attention and comment. The FLN gave a high priority to 
obtaining support from world opinion.5 Thirdly, the massacre was on a scale large enough, 
and in a place accessible enough, for one to expect a high degree of international outrage; it 
must be asked to what extent this existed. Fourthly, due to censorship, things could be said 
more directly outside than inside France. Pierre Vidal-Naquet's book on the use of torture by 
the French state in the Algerian war, including an account of 17 October, was published in 
English and Italian in 1963, and not in France until 1972.6 Fifthly, it needs to be seen in the 
context of wider concerns about decolonisation and racial violence. 
Finally and crucially, a specific aim of the demonstration was to influence 
international opinion. The FLN mouthpiece El Moudjahid described the demonstration's aim 
as 'pour attirer l'attention de l'opinion publique française et internationale'. The choice of 
central Paris as a venue was partly conditioned by this target. As Ali Haroun, an organiser of 
the demonstration, later put it, 'Pourquoi sur les grands boulevards? Parce que les Parisiens, 
les étrangers, les journalistes, seraient là'.8 This was particularly relevant, since Algeria was 
scheduled to come before the UN's decolonisation committee in November.9 It was a 
consideration not only for the leaders. Idir Belkacem, an 18 year-old worker in the suburb of 
Nanterre, recounted setting out to demonstrate in his best suit and tie, convinced that it would 
pass off peacefully, safe in the knowledge that there would be passers-by and tourists to 
witness any trouble10 [My emphasis]. 
When, the FLN sarcastically asked, would a yellow star be instituted to distinguish 
Algerians from Italians, Spaniards and South American tourists?11 The responses of non-
Algerian immigrants indicate the extent to which there was perceived to be a hierarchy 
amongst immigrants. It is worth stressing how, from the police point of view, the category of 
Algerian (technically Français Musulman d'Algérie) was in practice defined by physical 
appearance, rather than by formal citizenship. Numerous instances were reported on identity 
checks of people having their papers ripped up in front of them or even shot as they reached 
for them.12 Yet for many immigrants, the opposite was true: the precise definitions used by 
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the French state to define citizens and non-citizens were perceived as a shield against the 
state by non-citizens. For instance, when police came onto a bus and arrested all those with 
dark curly hair, Spaniards and Italians protested, 'Attention, je ne suis pas algérien!'13 
Even amongst North Africans, some Moroccans and Tunisians mistakenly assumed 
themselves to be exempt from police violence. Moroccans in the Nanterre shanty-town where 
many Algerians lived took care to write 'Marocain' on their door to ward off the police.14 In a 
letter to the Tunisian weekly Afrique-Action, Maâmar Sayah, a Tunisian living in Paris, 
stated that when the police charged on 17 October, 'il a fallu que je déclare que j'étais 
étranger pour ne pas avoir la figure en sang'.15 This remark is most revealing of the way that 
the repression was seen to be directed internally towards those still French subjects; by virtue 
of being a citizen of an independent state, Sayah felt immune. It is a strange kind of racism in 
which, it is thought, to be foreign is to escape from it.  
Nevertheless, some solidarity from fellow North Africans was inevitable given recent 
history. In addition to the GPRA's location in Tunis, the war had involved two specific 
instances of French violence against Tunisia that left a legacy of bitterness. In February 1958 
the French airforce had attacked a Tunisian village supposed to be harbouring FLN rebels.16 
Fresh in Tunisians' minds was the Bizerta incident of summer 1961, when a Tunisian attempt 
to occupy the naval base there, leased to France, was met with a massive French assault, in 
which 700 Tunisians and 24 Frenchmen died in three days, prompting widespread 
international condemnation.17 However, some Tunisian workers in Paris asked why their 
government, unlike the Moroccan one, was not speaking up about repression to which they 
were subjected.18  
In the newly independent ex-French colonies in West Africa, reporting of the 
demonstration divided on clearly political lines. Newspapers in Ivory Coast, Senegal and 
Niger gave little prominence to the story and presented the official version,19 failing to report 
subsequent accounts of atrocities. By contrast, the official newspaper in Guinea covered the 
story from the FLN point of view.20 The difference can easily be explained with reference to 
the history of decolonisation in the region. Guinea alone had in 1958 refused to go along with 
de Gaulle's plan for reorganisation of the colonies into a 'French Community' and declared 
independence under a Marxist regime. The other countries had been granted independence in 
1960 with strong neo-colonial ties to France under Francophile elites.21 Hence their 
newspapers considered the visit of President Senghor of Senegal to Paris an event worthy of 
more coverage than the massacre.22 Nevertheless, the detainees' hunger strike, which 
followed in November, received plenty of coverage,23 perhaps because it presented France in 
an merely unfavourable rather than appalling light.  
In the Muslim world, the actions of the French authorities naturally came in for 
condemnation, although there was a tendency to subsume the massacre under the general 
heading of French crimes in Algeria. In Cairo, a rally organised by the Secretariat of the 
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, to mark the seventh anniversary of the Algerian 
uprising, included a denunciation of 'savage actions perpetrated by the French authorities 
against the Algerian civilians in France and Algeria'.24 The Pakistan Times carried angry 
editorials on the Bizerta atrocities25 and on the deportations of Algerian prisoners from Paris 
to internment camps in Algeria, in the aftermath of 17 October,26 but not, interestingly, on 
the killings themselves. Pakistan introduced a United Nations resolution demanding political 
status for the Algerian prisoners in France, but which did not mention the demonstrations. It 
was supported mainly by Soviet bloc and Third World states, while the main Western powers 
abstained.27  
The massacre indeed received much attention in what was then known as the Third 
World. In India, the weekly magazine Link concluded that the 20% of truth in the 
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'Republican Policemen' tract, implied by police union protestations that it was 80% false, 'is 
sufficient to condemn the conduct of the Paris police in the eyes of the civilised world'.28 In 
Ghana, initial reports bucked the trend by clearly stating that 'Club-swinging French police 
charged and opened fire on peaceful Algerian demonstrators'.29 A student protest against the 
repression of the demonstration took place there at the French embassy in Accra.30 Hence 
K.S. Karol judged that, given the blatant western double standards exposed by the lack of 
formal condemnation of the massacre, 'the West as a whole will ultimately have to pay the 
price for the Paris Pogrom'.31  
This comment made sense given the context. The massacre occurred at a time of 
international concern about racial conflict: take the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa in 
1960, the civil rights movement in the USA or the debate in late 1961 about immigration 
controls in Britain, after the 1958 riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham. In the previous two 
months there had been major riots against Asians in Middlesborough32 and against Italians 
and Spaniards in the Dutch region of Twente. It was at the height of decolonisation and a 
time of great optimism in anti-imperialist milieux, symbolised by the publication of Fanon's 
The Wretched Of The Earth.34  
Moreover, many of the hopes of interested outsiders for Third World socialist 
revolution centred on Algeria. The British left-winger Fenner Brockway, reporting on a 
meeting of the Mediterranean and Middle East Campaign against Colonialism, stated that  
 
I was surprised to find the degree of confidence about Algeria. The decision was even 
taken to hold next year's annual conference there!35  
 
Conversely, for Francophone anti-imperialists, concern about the massacre was 
situated within a wider desire to liquidate the remnants of colonialism. The cover of the issue 
of Afrique-Action reporting the 17 October demonstration featured a photograph of 
Portuguese soldiers carrying the head of a decapitated Angolan,36 an image which also 
appeared in the French anti-war journal Vérité-Liberté.37  
As for Britain, reporting was only mildly critical of the French authorities. A leading 
article in the Times denounced both 'communities' ('French' and 'Muslim') for using violence, 
reserving criticism of the government to attacking the deportations on pragmatic rather than 
moral grounds: less Algerian workers in France meant less money sent home to families in 
Algeria, which meant more poverty and hence more unrest there.38 The Sunday Reynolds 
News did so in stronger terms, describing the thousands of arrests on 17 October as a 
'BLUNDER' and a 'DISGRACE TO FRANCE', while focusing on this aspect rather than the 
killings.39 As a Guardian correspondent then in Paris puts it,  
 
The British papers reported the October slaughter mechanically in terms of an 
Algerian demonstration that had turned into a riot, put down, perhaps a bit too 
brutally, by the police.40  
 
It fitted into a climate of concern about low-level political disturbance; on the very 
night of 17 October, British members of parliament were debating allegations of police 
beating, kicking and throwing into fountains of anti-nuclear demonstrators in Trafalgar 
Square a month earlier.41 Debate thus focused on relatively minor issues like poor conditions 
at the Vincennes detention centre,42 rather than the massacre itself. Subsequent reports of 
atrocities were reported, sometimes with a degree of outrage, but as allegation, whereas 
groundless official stories of the demonstrators opening fire had been reported as fact.43 A 
typical verdict was that the police were 'guilty of gross brutality', but 'Perhaps...not guilty of 
murder'.44 
Still, in what the French would call the 'Anglo-Saxon' countries, even those press 
reports most hostile to the Algerian demonstrators depicted the police in a somewhat sinister 
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light. The Spectator, while partially believing official stories about the FLN being 
responsible for the deaths, nevertheless noted the ominous circumstances of Papon's 
appointment as prefect of police in 1958: a crowd of 4000 policemen shouting antisemitic 
slogans.45 Time, which described the Algerians as a 'mob', a 'rabble' and 'swarming', also 
described the police in menacing terms: 'police, flailing night sticks and heavily weighted 
capes, clashed headlong with the mob'.46 Time's disdain for the Algerians is perhaps 
surprising, given that by this stage in the war the magazine, close to official circles, was 
recognising the legitimacy of Algerian nationalism and describing the nationalist leaders as 
upholding American ideals of democracy.47 It would thus appear to be motivated by an elitist 
contempt for the masses appearing on the streets, as opposed to the acceptable leaders.  
The New Republic did eventually denounce, on 27 November, the 'cold-blooded brutality of 
the police' as 'worse than the comparable treatment of Jews in Paris under Nazi rule', and 
borrowed the metaphor of plague from Camus.48 But the American response was generally 
poor. The New York Times, flying in the face of all evidence to the contrary, stated that 'Paris 
is remarkably free of racism'.49 As more than one contemporary pointed out, if the massacre 
had taken place in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, it would have attracted far more 
widespread coverage and condemnation.50 This seems to act as confirmation of Noam 
Chomsky's thesis that the US media tend to play down atrocities committed by a friendly 
state because they do not serve the propaganda interests of state and business.51 Was it pure 
coincidence that the issue of Time insinuating that the deported Algerians were being 
transported in luxury by Air France ('wine with meals') also carried an advertisement for Air 
France flights to the USA, perhaps aimed at French businessmen? 52  
It might be expected that a struggle over segregation, complete with lynchings, would 
have had particular resonance in the USA. But few comparisons appear to have been made 
with the race situation in the South. Perhaps this was because the non-violence of the 
Algerian demonstrators was not reported, thus obscuring an obvious similarity with Civil 
Rights marchers. Or possibly it was simply too close to home; Time preferred a South 
African comparison.53 However in France, René Dazy said of 17 October, 'C'est l'intrusion de 
Jacksonville ou de Little Rock en plein Paris'.54 Looking back in his memoirs, Papon picked 
another example of mass mobilisation, by comparing the FLN's tactics unfavourably to 
Gandhi's. 55 
The presence of the Algerian demonstrators, and their support for the FLN, in 
addition to the brutalities carried out against them, thus found its way into newspapers 
around the world. The coverage received was, however, modest. Moreover, its impact varied 
according to ideological considerations. It also brought a response from other immigrants in 
France that revealed something of their attitudes to each other and authority. 
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